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Abstract: 
 
Three experiments tested whether a modified version of the Clustered Conceptual Span task (H. J. Haarmann, 
E. J. Davelaar, & M. Usher, 2003), which ostensibly requires active maintenance of semantic representations, 
predicted individual differences in higher-order cognitive abilities better than short-term memory (STM) span 
tasks or nonsemantic versions of the ―Conceptual‖ task did. Nonsemantic Conceptual tasks presented short 
word lists clustered by color, first letter, or initial vowel sound, and cued subjects to recall only 1 of 3 clusters 
from each list; the Semantic task clustered words by taxonomic category. The Semantic Conceptual task 
generally failed to predict incremental variance in either verbal abilities or general fluid intelligence beyond the 
other Conceptual tasks or STM span tasks. Although the Semantic task showed a stronger relation to working 
memory span tasks than did the nonsemantic tasks (Experiment 3), that stronger relation did not translate into 
strong prediction of cognitive individual differences. 
 
Article: 
 
Individual differences in short-term memory (STM) capacity are traditionally assessed with ―span‖ tasks that 
present short sequences of items, such as digits or words, for the subject to immediately recall in serial order 
(Jacobs, 1887; Dempster, 1981). Although these tasks are often referred to as ―simple‖ span tasks (e.g., La 
Pointe & Engle, 1990; Turner & Engle, 1989), they have prompted a host of competing and complex theoretical 
models of serial-order memory (e.g., Burgess & Hitch, 1999; Farrell & Lewandowsky, 2002; Henson, 1998; 
Neath & Nairne, 1995; Page & Norris, 1998). Experimental and neuropsychological work also suggests that 
dissociable storage systems for phonological and lexical-semantic information contribute to a variety of verbal 
STM tasks (e.g., Crosson et al., 1999; Haarman & Usher, 2001; Hanten & Martin, 2000; Martin & Romani, 
1994; Tehan & Lalor, 2000; for a review, see Martin & Freedman, 2001). Based on the idea that a dedicated 
memory system for maintaining access to lexical-semantic representations might be especially important to 
successful language comprehension and verbal problem solving, Haarmann, Davelaar, and Usher (2003) 
developed a new span task, ―Conceptual Span,‖ to measure variation in semantic STM and its association to 
verbal abilities. The present study critically explores the construct validity of Conceptual Span as an individual-
differences measure of immediate-semantic memory capacity. 
 
The Conceptual Span Task 
 
Traditional STM tasks require verbatim repetition of unrelated stimuli in sequential order, and thus encourage 
subjects to phonologically rehearse the items via inner speech (e.g., Baddeley, Gathercole, & Papagno, 1998; 
Baddeley, Lewis & Vallar, 1984). In contrast, Conceptual Span was designed to orient subjects’ maintenance 
and retrieval processes toward stimulus meaning. One version of the task presented lists of 9 randomly ordered 
words that belonged to 3 different semantic categories (e.g., animals, furniture, and fruit), and another 
―clustered‖ version presented lists of 12 semantically clustered words, with 4 consecutive words from each 
category. In both, subjects immediately recalled only the words from one cued category (e.g., furniture) in any 
order, thereby minimizing the importance of serial order and the contribution of phonological processing, and 
maximizing the role of semantic processing. 
 
Haarmann et al. (2003) found that Conceptual Span predicted variation in reasoning and comprehension more 
strongly than did STM span tasks which, because they presented either words or pronounceable nonwords, en-
gaged primarily phonological processes. Thus, semantic STM did appear to support complex verbal behavior. 
Moreover, and perhaps most surprisingly, Conceptual Span predicted verbal individual differences as strongly, 
if not more strongly, than a Reading Span task did. Reading span is a ―complex‖ working memory (WM) span 
task that requires subjects to memorize short stimulus sequences that are interpolated with a secondary task, 
such as reading sentences. WM span tasks correlate robustly with both verbal and nonverbal intellectual 
abilities (e.g., Conway et al., 2005; Daneman & Merikle, 1996; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). It is 
therefore noteworthy that Haarmann et al. (Study 2) found Conceptual Span to correlate with verbal 
comprehension and problem-solving tests with rs = .34–.51, compared to Reading Span rs = .22–.38, and in a 
pilot study, Conceptual Span correlated with a test of nonverbal reasoning more strongly than WM span tasks 
usually do, indicating the utility of Conceptual Span to investigating general fluid intelligence (Gf). 
 
Strong predictive validity for Conceptual Span compared to WM span has important theoretical and practical 
implications. As Haarmann et al. (2003) noted, several views of WM capacity argue that individual differences 
in WM span, and their considerable correlations with Gf, result primarily from individual differences in 
domain-general attention processes that are captured by the dual-task requirements of WM span tasks, rather 
than from some more domain-specific storage or rehearsal processes (e.g., Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 
2004; Cowan, 2005; Engle & Kane, 2004; Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001). Thus, on one hand, Conceptual 
Span’s apparently broad predictive power may suggest that its cued- and selective-recall requirements, coupled 
with its de-emphasis of phonological rehearsal, somehow draw upon similar attention-control processes as do 
WM span tasks. If so, then semantics, per se, may not be important to Conceptual Span as an individual-
differences measure. Instead, it could be that any task asking subjects to selectively recall a subset of list items 
based on some dimension—even a nonsemantic one (such as color, shape, or orthography)— would yield 
similar patterns of ability correlations. Although such a result would limit Conceptual Span’s value to 
illuminate the nature or functions of a semantic WM system, it would not diminish the task’s importance. On 
the contrary, because current WM span tasks all require a secondary processing or manipulation task in addition 
to memory storage, they are far from process pure and they are cognitively opaque to the researchers who wish 
to understand them (see Oberauer, 2005). Thus, an ostensibly simpler, ―storage only‖ WM span task would be 
very useful to the field. 
 
On the other hand, as Haarmann et al. (2003) suggest, Conceptual Span’s impressive predictive validity may in-
dicate that the maintenance of semantic representations serves as an additional contributor to higher-order 
cognitive ability, complementary to the attention-control variance tapped by WM span. If so, this would be an 
exciting development that could increase, many-fold, the variance in intellectual abilities (including verbal 
ability and Gf) that is captured by immediate-memory tasks. Latent variables that are statistically derived from 
the common variance among multiple ―complex WM‖ span tasks account for about 50% of the variance in Gf 
among young adults (see Kane et al., 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Sü13, 2005). Thus, any incremental 
Gf variance that could be accounted for by multiple ―semantic WM‖ tasks would narrow considerably the 
search for mechanistic explanations for general fluid ability. 
 
Which interpretation of Conceptual Span is more likely to be correct? Does it reflect attention control in a simi-
lar manner to WM span, or does it measure a different construct that is critically linked to maintaining semantic 
memory representations? And, in either case, does Conceptual Span really have the broad predictive power that 
the initial work by Haarmann et al. (2003) suggests? We designed the present studies to answer these questions, 
but we can also turn to a few studies using quite similar tasks for preliminary guidance. 
 
Other “Conceptual” Tasks 
 
Several immediate-semantic-memory tasks have good predictive validity.
1
 Horn, Donaldson, and Engstrom 
(1981) created ―conceptual‖ tasks based on experimental paradigms (Bousfield & Bousfield,1966; 
Mandler,1968). In one, subjects categorically sorted 36 words and recalled them immediately or after a delay. In 
another, subjects heard and immediately recalled 20-word lists comprised of 5 categories each, with the words 
presented either randomly or clustered. Both tasks correlated with Gf in a sample of 20- to 60-year-olds, and 
both dramatically reduced the negative effect of age on Gf when they were partialed out: Gf decreased by 3.75 
IQ units per decade of age overall, but when the influence of either ―conceptual‖ task was removed, Gf 
decreased by less than 2 IQ units per decade. These findings suggest that immediate memory tasks requiring 
selective recall of semantically related items draw on similar cognitive processes as do fluid reasoning tests. But 
which processes contribute? Horn et al. defined Gf via a composite of letter series, nonverbal matrix 
completion, and nonverbal topology tests. It is therefore not obvious what contribution semantic representations 
could make. To us, then, these findings suggest that Conceptual Span’s correlations with at least some ability 
tasks derive from domain-general (attention?) processes rather than semantic ones. 
 
Further evidence that Conceptual Span draws at least some of its predictive power from nonsemantic sources 
comes from research on a cued-recall test of immediate memory developed by Cohen and Sandberg (1977, 
1980). They presented lists of 9 digits at a 4/sec rate, visually or aurally, and then immediately cued the subject 
to recall only the lists’ first, second, or third cluster of 3 digits in serial order. Digits have limited semantic 
representation in memory, and any semantic contribution to performance was further reduced by requiring serial 
order memory. Even so, in three studies with adolescents, Cohen and Sandberg found that cued-recall scores, 
particularly for the final, recency cluster of the lists, correlated with IQ in the .40–.60 range. (Ability 
correlations for the mid-list clusters averaged in the .20–.30 range.) 
 
Moreover, in college students, Cantor, Engle, and Hamilton (1991) found that recall from both middle and 
recency portions of digit and word lists correlated with verbal Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores (rs ≈ .30); 
Bunting (2006) found both list types to predict Gf. These data suggest that, on one hand, any cued-recall task, 
even those that minimize semantic processing, show reasonable correlations with verbal and general cognitive 
abilities. Indeed, Haarman et al. (2003, Study 3) reported that only performance for the middle and final clusters 
from their clustered Conceptual Span task correlated significantly with verbal abilities, thus mirroring the 
findings from the Cohen-Sandberg task. On the other hand, the data from adults suggest some hope for 
Haarmann and colleagues’ view: Cantor et al. (1991) found their cued-recall tasks to correlate a bit less strongly 
with SAT scores (rs ≈ .30) than did WM span tasks (rs ≈ .40), and the trends in Bun- 
ting (2006) were similar for Gf. Given that Haarman et al. found that Conceptual Span correlated as strongly 
with verbal ability as did WM span, the lower ability correlations found by Cantor et al. and Bunting may 
suggest that cued-recall tasks for list position do not capture the same individual differences that Conceptual 
Span does. 
 
The Present Study 
 
We tested the construct validity of Conceptual Span as an individual-differences measure of immediate seman-
tic memory by correlating a clustered version of the task (―Clustered Conceptual Span‖) to performance on 
various memory span and cognitive ability tasks, including verbal ability and Gf. We used the Clustered task, 
exclusively, on the advice of Haarmann et al. (2003). Recall that the Clustered Conceptual task presented 
consecutive items from each category, rather than presenting items randomly through the list. Haarmann et al. 
(Study 3) found that non-clustered Conceptual Span predicted incremental variance in some verbal abilities 
beyond that accounted for by the Clustered task. This finding suggests that some aspects of clustering ability (at 
encoding, retrieval, or both), in addition to maintenance of semantic representations, contribute to the 
correlations between nonclustered Conceptual Span and complex cognitive abilities. Of course, such clustering 
abilities need not be specific to semantic information, and they might involve domain-general attentional 
processes. Thus, the more multiply-determined, nonclustered task only confounds the investigation of the 
processes contributing to Conceptual Span performance and its correlations with other tasks. 
 
In order to assess the reliability of Haarmann and colleagues’ (2003) findings, we compared the predictive 
power of a modified Clustered Conceptual Span to traditional (phonological) STM span (Experiments 1–3) and 
WM span (Experiment 3); the modification involved presenting clusters of different sizes (see Method). If the 
Haarman et al. findings are replicable, Conceptual Span should predict significant variance in verbal ability, Gf, 
or both, after STM-span-related variance is removed. It might also account for significant incremental variance 
in intellectual abilities after WM-span-related variance is removed (or, at the very least, Conceptual Span 
should correlate about as strongly with cognitive abilities as does WM span). 
 
Of most importance, we also compared Clustered Conceptual Span to nonsemantic clustered tasks, which cued 
subjects to recall a subset of items from each list, but the clustering and cuing involved nonsemantic stimulus 
dimensions. A Color Conceptual task (Experiment 1) presented list items clustered by their color, and subjects 
immediately recalled only the words that matched the color of the cue. An Orthographic Conceptual task 
(Experiments 1–3) presented list items clustered by their initial letter, and subjects recalled the words that 
matched the letter cue. And, finally, a Phonological Conceptual task (Experiments 2 and 3) presented list items 
clustered by their initial vowel sound, and subjects recalled the words that matched the vowel-sound cue. If 
maintenance of semantic representations is behind the predictive utility of the Haarman et al. (2003) ―Semantic‖ 
Conceptual Span task, then it should correlate only modestly with other, nonsemantic Conceptual tasks, and it 
should predict incremental variance in complex cognitive abilities beyond that accounted for by nonsemantic 
tasks. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Experiment 1 tested the importance of semantic processing to the predictive validity of the conceptual span 
task. To do this, we created three ―conceptual‖ span tasks that presented words that were clustered according to 
their semantic category (the Semantic Conceptual task), their initial letter (the Orthographic Conceptual task), 
or the color in which they were presented (the Color Conceptual task). We also tested the association between 
conceptual span and simple STM span, as well as their respective powers to predict individual differences in 
verbal ability and Gf. Three of the 4 STM span tasks presented either abstract words or pronounceable 
nonwords in order to emphasize phonological rather than semantic or ―conceptual‖ processing. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Eighty-seven students at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) participated for credit toward 
a course requirement; we dropped the data from 7 subjects who did not complete the entire study, leaving data 
from 80 subjects in all analyses. 
 
Materials 
 
In all the memory tasks, subjects saw the same list of stimuli in the same fixed order. 
 
Clustered conceptual span. We constructed all conceptual tasks from the same pool of 72 words, representing 
6 semantic categories (Animals, Produce (fruits & vegetables), Occupations, Tools, Clothing, Body Parts; 
Battig & Montague, 1969) and 6 initial letters (P, S, C, B, L, M). In the Color task, words were presented in red, 
blue, green, yellow, pink, or white against a black background; in the other conceptual tasks, all words appeared 
in white against black. Each test comprised 18 trials, each presenting 12 words followed by a cluster recall cue 
(i.e., a word indicating the to-berecalled semantic category, first letter, or color, all of which had been presented 
consecutively). Sound psychometric practice calls for creating tests with items that vary in difficulty (e.g., the 
application of item-response theory or Rasch models to psychological tests requires variation in item difficulty; 
e.g., Hambleton, Swaminathan, & Rogers, 1991); in span tasks this is accomplished by presenting lists of 
varying lengths. In our Conceptual tasks, then, the 12 words of a trial always consisted of a 3-word, a 4-word, 
and a 5-word cluster in an unpredictable order, and subjects were sometimes asked to recall the 3-word cluster, 
and other times the 4- or 5-word cluster. Words within a cluster were always unrelated along the dimensions 
irrelevant to the task (e.g., in the Color task, the words within a color cluster were all represented different 
semantic categories and all began with different letters). 
 
Within each test, each of the 6 cluster-recall cues appeared three times, but only once to cue each cluster (serial) 
position. For example, in the Semantic task a cluster of 3 target Tool words appeared once in serial position 1, a 
cluster of 4 target tools appeared once at position 2, and a cluster of 5 target tools appeared once at position 3. 
Cluster size, cluster category, and cluster serial position were counterbalanced in each task, with each cluster 
size appearing six times at each serial position, and each category appearing three times in each serial position 
(once as a 3-word, 4-word, and 5-word cluster). Each of the 72 words appeared once in each test as a to-be-
recalled target word and two times as a nontarget. Three practice trials of 12 words each used the same words 
as the real trials, but not repeating any of the real-trial target clusters. 
 
Simple STM span. All the STM span tasks presented stimuli in black font against a white background. 
 
Concrete word span. This task consisted of 87 one- and two-syllable words (6 were for practice trials) from 
Battig and Montague (1969), 12 of which appeared in the Conceptual tasks, plus another 12 drawn from the 
same semantic categories; the remaining 57 words were drawn from other categories (examples from this task 
are goat, hill, fork, brick, lawyer). Eighteen trials presented 3 trials each at list lengths 2–7 (three practice trials 
presented 2 words each). Although multiple words from the same semantic category could appear within a trial, 
none of the 12 words from the Conceptual tasks appeared together in a trial. (The sixth trial from this task was 
deleted from data analyses because it presented a word that had appeared in an earlier trial.) 
 
Concrete nonword span. This task consisted of 87 pronounceable, 1- and 2-syllable nonwords (6 for practice 
trials), created from real words by changing 1 or 2 letters from words drawn from Battig and Montague (1969), 
but not appearing in Concrete Word span. All other details matched those of Concrete Word span. Some 
example nonwords from the test are yan, tace, dallen, rilo, and choan (derived from yen, tick, mallet, polo, and 
stone, respectively). 
 
Abstract word span. This task consisted of 87 (6 for practice trials) 1-syllable words drawn from the MRC 
Psycholinguistic Database (www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.htm). All the words had relatively 
low Concreteness values (200–400, out of a possible 700) as reflected by a combination of published norms 
(see Coltheart, 1981). Example words are myth, pact, rate, week, and view. Other details matched those of 
Concrete Word span. 
 
Abstract nonword span. This task consisted of 87 pronounceable nonwords (6 for practice trials), created from 
real words by changing 1 or 2 letters from words drawn from the MRC database with the same characteristics 
as those from the Abstract Word span task. Some examples are naid, balt, reez, lurst, and mot (derived from 
gait, tale, peep, curse, and woe, respectively). All other details matched those of Abstract Word span. 
 
Verbal ability tests. We used three standardized tests adapted by Kane et al. (2004). The Reading 
Comprehension test was abridged from the Air Force Officer Qualifying Test (AFOQT; Berger, Gupta, Berger, 
& Skinner, 1990). Subjects had 9 min to complete 14 items. Each item presented a short, incomplete paragraph 
and subjects chose the best of 5 available completions for it. The modified Analogies test (also from the 
AFOQT) presented relatively high frequency words to make the test more sensitive to reasoning than 
vocabulary differences. Subjects had 5 min to complete 18 items that presented an incomplete analogy with 5 
possible completions. The Inferences test came from the Educational Testing Service (ETS) Kit of Standard 
Referenced Tests (Ekstrom, French, Harman, & Derman, 1976). Subjects had 6 min to complete the 10 items 
from Part 1 of the original test. Each item presented a 1–3 sentence passage and subjects chose the best of 5 
inferences that could be drawn without assuming any additional information. 
 
Gf/matrix reasoning tests. We assessed Gf with abridged versions of three matrix reasoning tasks (from Kane 
et al., 2004), all of which presented patterns of abstract figures with one figure missing. Subjects chose the best 
available completion. The Ravens Advanced Progressive Matrices (RAPM; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998) pre-
sented 18 items with a 25-min time limit. The matrix reasoning test from the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of 
Intelligence (WASI; The Psychological Corporation, 1999) presented 14 items in 8 min, and the matrix 
reasoning test from the Revised Beta Examination— Third Edition (BETA III; Kellogg & Morton, 1999) 
presented 20 items in 4 min. 
 
Procedure 
 
We individually tested subjects in two 2-h sessions. In the first, they completed the seven span tasks in this 
order: Concrete Word, Abstract Nonword, Color Conceptual, Orthographic Conceptual, Semantic Conceptual, 
Concrete Nonword, and Abstract Word. In the second, subjects completed the three Gf and three verbal ability 
tasks in this order: RAPM, Reading Comprehension, WASI, Analogies, BETA, and Inferences. All tasks 
provided written instructions read aloud by the experimenter; all tasks required written responses. Subjects 
began the next ability/reasoning task only after the full time was used for the previous one. 
 
All conceptual span tasks presented each word in lowercase font for 1 sec, with a 250-msec blank screen 
between each. A trial was terminated by the appearance of an uppercase word and question mark as a cluster-
recall cue (i.e., the category name for the Semantic task (CLOTHING?), the first letter for the Orthographic task 
(L?), or the color name (BLUE?), presented in that color, for the Color task). Subjects read each word silently 
and recalled the cued cluster of items in any order; instructions emphasized the unimportance of serial recall 
and the importance of recalling items from the cued cluster only. We imposed no time limit on recall. Each 
conceptual task began with three practice trials of 12 items each. Before practice in the Semantic and 
Orthographic tasks, subjects saw the full list of stimuli, categorized by the relevant dimension for the task (e.g., 
by taxonomic category for the Semantic task), and read each word aloud. This was done to familiarize subjects 
with the categories and their exemplars, as well as to help induce enough proactive interference so that subjects 
would rely on STM, rather than LTM during the test (see Haarmann et al., 2003); PI was also induced through 
subjects’ prior exposure these words in the Color task (and to some in the Concrete Word task). 
 
All STM tasks presented stimuli in lowercase font for 1 sec, with a 500-msec blank screen between each. Each 
trial was terminated by a recall cue on-screen (―???‖). Subjects read each stimulus silently and provided written 
recall in serial order; we encouraged subjects to guess or leave a blank space if they could not remember an 
item at a given serial position. Recall time was unlimited. Each STM task began with three practice trials of two 
items each. 
 
Data Scoring 
 
For span tasks, the total score reflected the mean proportion correct, averaged across all the trials in the task. In 
the STM tasks, we considered a stimulus within a trial to be correct only if it was recalled in its appropriate 
serial position. For example, in a listlength-3 trial, such as truth-last-aim, an output of ―truth, aim, last‖ or ―___, 
last, game‖ would yield a trial score of.333, because only one word was recalled in serial position. The 
nonword tasks required each stimulus to be spelled perfectly; the word tasks required that the word 
unambiguously represent the presented word. Serial order did not enter into scoring the Conceptual tasks. For 
all the ability and reasoning tasks, the total score reflected the proportion of correct items. 
 
Results 
 
For all inferential statistics reported hereafter, alpha = .05; effect sizes are reported as partial eta squared (𝜂p
2). 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Mean Performance 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all measures. All were normally distributed as indicated by skew and 
kurtosis (with values less than 3 and 4, respectively; Kline, 2004), and the Conceptual and STM span tasks 
demonstrated adequate reliability as indicated by Cronbach’s α. Reliability estimates were not available for the 
verbal-ability or Gf tests, but they showed good reliability in a similar sample (Kane et al., 2004), and their 
substantial intercorrelations indicated adequate reliability here. 
 
 
 
The conceptual tasks differed significantly from each other in Mperformance [F(2,158) = 182.18, partial 𝜂p
2 = 
.70], with the Color task yielding lower recall than the Orthographic task [t(79) = 13.16], and the Orthographic 
task yielding lower recall than the Semantic task [t(79) = 4.75]. We analyzed the STM tasks with a 2 (lexicality: 
word vs. nonword) × 2 (concreteness: concrete vs. abstract) ANOVA. Word span tasks elicited higher recall 
than nonword tasks [F(1,79) = 2,266.82, 𝜂p
2 = .966], and concrete-word tasks elicited higher recall than abstract-
word tasks [F(1,79) = 51.59, 𝜂p
2 = .389]. The lexicality × concreteness interaction was also significant [F(1,79) 
= 9.86, 𝜂p
2 = .12], but all 4 tests differed from each other (lowest t = 2.77, p < .01). 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Memory Span Tasks 
 
Confirmatory factor analyses tested whether all the Conceptual tasks measured some common psychological 
processes, and at least somewhat different processes than those measured by simple STM span tasks. From 
inspection of the correlations among tasks in Table 2, both Conceptual and STM tasks showed convergent and 
discriminant validity, correlating more strongly with tasks of the same type than with the other type (e.g., the 
Conceptual tasks correlated among themselves with rs = .58–.74 and with the STM tasks with rs = .39–.66). 
 
We modeled the span data with a 2-factor structure, with the three Conceptual tasks comprising a ―Conceptual‖ 
factor and the four STM tasks comprising an ―STM‖ factor (we allowed residuals of the two Word STM tasks 
to correlate and the two Nonword tasks to correlate, given the strong effect of lexicality on recall, described 
above, and given that we had two tasks of each type). Figure 1 presents the model, which fit the data well 
(indicated by a nonsignificant chi-square, a χ
2
/dfratio < 2, an RMSEA index below .10, and CFI and NFI indices 
above .90) [χ
2
(11) = 8.34, p > .05, χ
2
/df = 0.76, RMSEA = .00, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .98]. Conceptual and STM 
factors shared more than 60% of their variance, but a model forcing all the span tasks to load on a single factor 
did not fit the data [χ
 2
(12) = 28.79, p < .05, χ
 2
/df = 2.40, RMSEA = .13, CFI = .95, NFI = .92]. 
 
Regression Analyses 
 
To test whether the Semantic task was a particularly strong predictor of either verbal ability (a z-score com-
posite of Reading Comprehension, Analogies, and Inferences) or Gf (a z-score composite of Ravens, WASI, 
and Beta III), we first conducted regression analyses in which the Color and Orthographic tasks were entered as 
predictors before the Semantic task. If semantic processing is important to complex cognition, then it should 
account for significant variance in verbal or fluid abilities beyond that accounted for by the nonsemantic 
Conceptual tasks. We then tested whether any of the Conceptual tasks predicted intellectual ability after 
accounting for simple STM span performance by conducting regressions in which a z-score composite measure 
from the STM tasks was entered before the three conceptual tasks (see Table 3). 
 
All three Conceptual tasks correlated significantly with the verbal ability and Gf composites. With respect to 
verbal ability, however, the Semantic task did not predict unique variance (∆R
2
 = .005, p > .05) after accounting 
for the Color and Orthographic tasks (R
2
 = .243). Moreover, in the subsequent analysis in which we entered the 
STM composite first (R
2
 = .291), none of the Conceptual tasks made significant contributions. We found the 
same pattern in predicting Gf (although, as expected, the verbal memory tasks accounted for less total variance 
here). The Semantic task accounted for no unique variance after accounting for the Color and Orthographic 
tasks (∆R
2
 = .003), and none of the Conceptual tasks predicted unique Gf variance after accounting for STM. 
(Regressions that entered the STM tasks individually, rather than as a composite, yielded identical results 
except that the Orthographic task predicted incremental variance in verbal ability beyond the STM and Color 
tasks, ∆R
2
 = .047). 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Does the Semantic Conceptual task measure anything substantially different from nonsemantic versions of this 
selective-recall task? Experiment 1 suggests not. First, the Semantic, Orthographic, and Color Conceptual tasks 
formed a tight latent variable in a confirmatory factor analysis, suggesting that they measured largely a single 
construct. This construct was distinct from, but related to, that tapped by simple span tests of STM, which os-
tensibly emphasize phonological encoding, rehearsal, and retrieval. Second, the Semantic Conceptual task 
predicted no variance in either verbal or fluid abilities after accounting for what it shared with the Color and 
Orthographic tasks. Moreover, none of the Conceptual tasks accounted for incremental variance in intellectual 
ability beyond that accounted for by simple STM (except where the Orthographic task predicted verbal ability 
beyond the individually entered STM tasks). So, although Conceptual tasks appear to measure something 
beyond simple, phonological STM, this unique variance did not seem to predict higher-order cognitive ability. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Experiment 1’s findings conflicted with Haarmann et al. (2003), and so they required replication. Experiment 2 
again contrasted the Semantic Conceptual task with other Conceptual and STM tasks, but here we defined 
verbal ability and Gf differently, and with more indicators; the verbal tasks were more focused on reading 
comprehension than on reasoning, whereas the Gf tests assessed both inductive reasoning and spatial 
visualization. We also replaced the Color Conceptual task with a new task. The Color task differed from the 
other Conceptual tasks because its target dimension was arbitrary and not a naturally integrated feature of the 
stimuli. We therefore created a third ―integrated‖ Conceptual task, and one that would be theoretically 
informative with respect to Haarmann and colleagues’ claims about semantic versus phonological STM 
processes and their respective contributions to verbal ability. Specifically, a Phonological Conceptual task 
presented items clustered by their initial vowel sounds, and so required subjects to selectively recall a subset of 
list items like the other Conceptual tasks. Because the target cluster dimension was phonological, however, it 
should correlate more strongly with, and show patterns of predictive validity more similar to, simple STM 
tasks. 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
One hundred three UNCG students participated for credit toward a course requirement. We excluded data from 
16 subjects: 9 did not complete the study, 5 did not understand all the tasks, 1 was extremely sleepy, and several 
task’s worth of data were lost from 1 other subject. Experiment 2 thus included data from 87 subjects. 
 
 
 
Materials 
 
Memory span tasks. We used five of the span tasks from Experiment 1 (Semantic and Orthographic 
Conceptual, Concrete Word, Abstract Word, and Abstract Nonword) and created a Phonological Conceptual 
task to replace the Color task. The Phonological task presented items clustered by their first vowel sound (―EH‖ 
as in vest, ―OW‖ as in cow, ―OO‖ as in moose, ―EYE‖ as in spy, ―OH‖ as in bone, ―UH‖ as in bucket; 12 words 
per cluster type). We clustered by first vowel sounds in order to distinguish the Phonological from the 
Orthographic task. We also selected items for each vowel sound that differed as much as possible in their 
spelling of the critical sound (e.g., ―EH‖: measure, leopard, pelvis, chef; ―OW‖: mouth, blouse, owl, gown; 
―OO‖: moose, suit, jeweler, prune; ―EYE‖: nylons, coyote, pineapple, pliers; ―OH‖: crowbar, bolt, coat, 
shoulder; ―UH‖: pumps, onion, banana, blood). Due to vowel-sound constraints, only 25 of the words from the 
Phonological task matched those from the Semantic and Orthographic tasks (47 were new), but they all 
represented the same semantic categories (Animals (14 words), Produce (12), Jobs (10), Tools (10), Clothing 
(13), Body parts (13)). To-be-recalled target items, cluster sizes, and cluster serial positions were 
counterbalanced across trials as in the other Conceptual tasks. 
 
Verbal reasoning tests. Experiment 2 used 4 verbal tasks emphasizing reading comprehension. AFOQT 
Reading Comprehension from Experiment 1 was expanded to 20 of the test’s original items, with a 10-min time 
limit. The Nelson-Denny consisted of 6 short passages with 4 questions each, with a 12-min limit. The ―College 
Board‖ test consisted of 8 passages we selected from PSAT, SAT, and GRE test preparation books. The 
passages varied in length, and the test consisted of 24 questions with a 15-min limit. Very few subjects 
completed more than 16 questions, so we scored the test for only these questions (the first 4 questions related to 
passage 1, the next 6 related to the content of passages 2, 3, or both, and the last 6 related to the content of 
passages 4, 5, or both). Finally, ACT Passage Revision presented 2 passages and 28 questions, with a 10-min 
limit. The passages had various words or phrases underlined, and subjects selected among 3 revisions (plus a 
―no change‖ option) for the underlined portion that best represented the relevant idea and best fit the style of the 
passage. 
 
Gf tasks. We measured Gf with five inductive-reasoning and spatial-visualization tasks. The RAPM was 
identical to that in Experiment 1, but with a 13-min limit. The ETS Letter Sets task consisted of 15 items with a 
6-min limit. Each item presented five sets of letters (e.g., NOPQ, DBFL, ABCD, HIJK, UVWX), of which four 
sets comprised letters grouped according to the same rule. Subjects selected the ―odd-man-out‖ set that 
followed a different rule. The ETS Locations test had 14 items with a 6-min limit. Each item presented five 
rows of dashes grouped together, and in each of four rows, an ―X‖ replaced a dash in one of the groupings 
according to the same rule. The fifth row presented the numbers 1–5, each replacing one dash, and subjects 
chose which number would be replaced by an X according to the rule. The ETS Paper Folding test presented 10 
items with a 4-min limit. Each item showed a square piece of paper folded 1–3 times and then punched with 
one or two holes. Subjects selected one of five illustrations representing the positions of the punched holes if 
the paper were unfolded. Finally, the ETS Surface Development test consisted of 5 items with a 6-min limit. 
Each item showed a piece of paper that, when folded, would make the 3-dimensional shape next to it. Some 
edges of the unfolded paper were marked with letters, and five of the edges of the shape were marked with 
numbers. Subjects matched each of the five numbered edges to the corresponding lettered edge (and so each 
item required five responses). 
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects completed two 2-h sessions. The first tested subjects individually and the second tested groups of 1–6. 
In the first session, subjects completed the memory tasks as in Experiment 1, in the following order: Concrete 
Word, Orthographic Conceptual, Phonological Conceptual, Abstract Nonword, Semantic Conceptual, and 
Abstract Word. Before beginning the Phonological practice trials, subjects read aloud the stimuli, clustered by 
initial vowel sound. As in the Semantic and Orthographic tasks, this practice familiarized subjects with the 
word list, the clustering rules, and the capitalized recall cues (EH?, OW?, EW?, EYE?, OH?, and UH?), and it 
promoted interference. During the actual Phonological task, the experimenter read aloud each recall cue when it 
was presented, in order to emphasize its sound. 
 
In the second session, subjects completed the verbal and Gf tests in the following order: College Board Reading 
Comprehension, RAPM, ETS Surface Development, AFOQT Reading Comprehension, ETS Locations, ETS 
Letter Sets, Nelson-Denny, ETS Paper-folding, and ACT Passage Revision. Subjects began the next test only 
after time expired for the previous one. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Mean Performance 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for all measures. All were normally distributed as indicated by skew and 
kurtosis, and the Conceptual and STM span tasks demonstrated adequate reliability. We also calculated reliability 
estimates for the verbal-ability and Gf tests, and all were adequate except for the College Board 
comprehension task (α = .334); we retained this measure despite its poor reliability estimate, however, because 
it correlated well with the other verbal measures (rs = .37–.57), suggesting a true reliability of at least .57. 
 
As in Experiment 1, the conceptual tasks differed significantly from each other in Mperformance [F(2,172) = 
464.21, partial 𝜂𝑝
2= .84], here with the Phonological task yielding much lower recall than the Orthographic task 
[t(86) = 26.27], and the Orthographic task again yielding slightly but significantly lower recall than the 
Semantic task [t(86) = 3.41 ]. The three STM tasks also differed significantly in mean recall [F(2,172) = 974.60, 
𝜂𝑝
2= .92], with the Abstract Nonword task showing lower recall than the Abstract Word task [t(86) = 35.67], and 
the Abstract Word task eliciting a bit worse performance than the Concrete Word task [t(86) = 4.43]. 
 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Memory Span Tasks 
 
Table 5 presents the correlations among the memory and reasoning tasks. As in Experiment 1, we modeled the 
Conceptual and STM tasks with two factors. However, because the Phonological Conceptual task should have 
focused subjects on the items’ phonology, performance here should have had more in common with the STM 
span tasks. Thus, we fit a second model in which both the Conceptual and STM factors loaded onto the 
Phonological task. 
 
The two-factor model with a link between the Phonological task and the Conceptual factor yielded a .73 
correlation between the Conceptual and STM factors (similar to the .80 correlation in Experiment 1), but the 
model did not fit the data well [x
2
(8) = 24.47, p < .05, x
2
/df = 3.06, RMSEA = .16, CFI = .94, NFI = .91 ]. Al-
lowing the Phonological task to split its loadings between factors, however, yielded an acceptable fitting model, 
which is presented in Figure 2 [x
2
(7) = 12.59, p > .05, x
2
/df = 1.80, RMSEA = .10, CFI = .98, NFI = .96]. This 
model fit the data significantly better than did the first [x
2
difference (1) = 11.88]. Note that, here, the Phonologi-
cal task had equivalent loadings on the two factors, and the correlation between factors was considerably lower 
than that in Experiment 1, with Conceptual and STM span sharing only 40% of their variance. As in Experiment 
1, a model forcing all the span tasks into a single factor did not fit the data [x
2
(7) = 53.15, p > .05, x
2
/df = 5.91, 
RMSEA = .24, CFI = .83, NFI = .81]. 
 
Regression Analyses 
 
We again tested for the importance of semantics to the predictive power of Conceptual span by regressing 
verbal ability and Gf onto the Semantic task after the Phonological and Orthographic tasks (and, also, after the 
STM tasks). Table 6 presents these analyses. Again, all three Conceptual tasks correlated with verbal ability and 
Gf (z-score composites of the verbal-ability and Gf scores, respectively). But here, only the Phonological task 
accounted for significant variance in verbal ability (R
2
 = .164); the Semantic task predicted no incremental 
variance (∆R
2
 = .005). As in Experiment 1, none of the Conceptual tasks predicted unique variance in verbal 
ability in the analysis that first entered the STM composite into the equation (nor did they when they were 
entered after the individual STM tasks, rather than the composite). Unlike the findings from Experiment 1, 
however, both the Phonological task (entered first: ∆R
2
 = .111) and the Semantic task (entered third: ∆R
2
 = .04) 
accounted for significant unique variance in Gf. Indeed, both of these tasks remained significant predictors of 
Gf even after the STM composite was accounted for (Phonological ∆R2 = .07; Semantic ∆R
2
 = .04; they were 
also significant after accounting for the individual STM tasks). 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 2 demonstrated that not all ―Conceptual‖ tasks are created equal. The Phonological task, in which 
subjects encoded and retrieved word clusters by phonology, rather than by semantics or orthography, shared as 
much variance with serial-recall STM tasks as with the other Conceptual tasks. That is, in a confirmatory factor 
analysis, the Phonological task split its loadings between the ―Conceptual‖ and ―STM‖ factors, suggesting that 
phonological processing is what distinguishes standard STM tasks from the Semantic (and Orthographic) Con-
ceptual task. Thus, as argued by Haarmann et al. (2003), nonphonological Conceptual tasks do seem to tap 
some different (nonphonological) processes and abilities than do standard STM tasks. That said, the 
Phonological task did not behave merely like a standard STM task, for it predicted unique variance in Gf after 
accounting for the STM-task variance, and variation in phonological STM is often not very predictive of Gf 
(e.g., Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). 
 
 
 
But what of the Semantic task? Consistent with the suggestions of Haarmann et al. (2003), but in contrast to Ex-
periment 1, here we found it to predict incremental variance in Gf after STM, Phonological, and Orthographic 
tasks were accounted for, suggesting that the Semantic task does uniquely tap some mental processes that are 
important to novel reasoning. Why did the Semantic task ―work‖ here but not in Experiment 1? One might 
guess that it is because we defined Gf slightly differently here, with less focus on matrix-reasoning tasks and 
more on general inductive reasoning and spatial visualization. One would be mistaken, however. When the 
RAPM test, which was common to both experiments, was regressed on the 3 Conceptual tasks from each 
experiment, the Semantic task accounted for no incremental variance beyond the other 2 Conceptual tasks in 
Experiment 1 (∆R
2
 = .000), but significant incremental variance beyond the other 2 tasks in Experiment 2 (∆R
2
 
= .048). Semantic Conceptual performance thus seems to have a fickle relation with Gf. 
 
We were disappointed that the Semantic task again failed to predict unique variance in verbal abilities after 
other memory tasks were accounted for. Whereas Experiment 1 had focused more on verbal reasoning, 
Experiment 2 focused more on reading comprehension, and yet, here, only the Phonological task accounted for 
unique variance in verbal ability (and only when the model did not include the STM composite; when the 
model included STM, none of the Conceptual tasks accounted for incremental variance). Experiment 2 thus 
provides only limited support for Haarmann and colleagues’ (2003) argument that the Semantic Conceptual 
task is somehow special in its ability to predict variation in higher-order cognitive ability. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Experiment 3 tested whether the Semantic Conceptual task might better predict versions of verbal-ability tests 
used originally by Haarmann et al. (2003), the ―Pronoun Texts‖ and ―Anomalies‖ tests (in addition to the 
Reading Comprehension and Analogies tests we used in the previous experiments). We also sought to replicate 
either the Experiment 1 or Experiment 2 findings concerning the relation between the Semantic task and Gf, 
with a computerized version of the RAPM test along with a more verbal Gf test. Experiment 3 also included 
two WM span tasks in order to test the relations among Conceptual, STM, and WM spans, and to examine their 
relative contributions to verbal ability and Gf. Finally, based on separate personal communications with Henk 
Haarmann and Randi Martin (June, 2004), we tested all subjects on the Semantic Conceptual task as the very 
first task, just in case subjects’ prior experience with STM and phonological tasks led them in Experiments 1 
and 2 to use some phonological processing, at least some of the time, in the Semantic task. 
 
 
 
Method 
 
Subjects 
 
Ninety-five UNCG students participated for partial course credit. We excluded data from 8 subjects: 4 did not 
complete the study, 1 was a nonnative English speaker, 1 made too many processing errors during Reading 
span, 1 had participated in Experiment 2, and 1 was repeatedly interrupted by his police radio. Experiment 3 
thus included data from 87 subjects. 
 
Materials 
 
Memory span tasks. We used the three Conceptual tasks and the Abstract Word and Abstract Nonword STM 
tasks from Experiment 2. We also included two ―complex,‖ or ―WM,‖ span tasks, Operation span (OSPAN) and 
Reading span (RSPAN). OSPAN required subjects to remember sequences of 2–5 words, in serial order, that 
were each preceded by an equation to verify (e.g., Is (10/2) — 3 = 2? DRUM). Subjects immediately read each 
equation aloud, then verified whether the answer was correct, and then immediately read the word aloud. The 
experimenter then immediately presented the next equation-word pair (or recall cue [???]) on-screen. Subjects 
completed four trials of each list length in a pseudorandom order. RSPAN was constructed and run in the same 
way, but the memoranda were preceded by sentences to judge as ―making sense‖ or not (e.g., The prosecutor’s 
dish was lost because it was not based on fact. ? LOAFERS). The memoranda for both OSPAN and RSPAN 
were drawn from the Conceptual, Concrete Word, and Abstract Word pools, with approximately equal 
representation. And, for both OSPAN and RSPAN, as in the STM tasks, subjects recalled the words by writing 
them in serial order; we also scored OSPAN and RSPAN in the same way we scored the STM tasks (except that 
retained subjects had to attain ≥85% accuracy in the equation and sentence judgment portions of the WM tasks). 
 
 
 
Verbal ability tests. Subjects completed four computerized tests of verbal ability. The AFOQT Reading 
Comprehension test presented the same 20 items as in Experiment 2, but on a computer screen and requiring 
keypress responses. Each paragraph appeared without its final sentence for 25 sec (or until the subject finished 
reading and pressed a key), then replaced by the final sentence and the 5 possible completions with a 20-sec 
limit. The AFOQT Analogies test presented the same 18 items as in Experiment 1, but with a 12-sec limit for 
each response. Pronoun Texts (modified from Haarmann et al., 20032) presented 4 passages of 12 sentences 
each, at a 6 sec per sentence rate (if subjects finished reading before time expired, they hit a key to view the 
next sentence), with each sentence replacing its predecessor on-screen. After the last sentence disappeared, 
subjects answered 4 multiple-choice questions about details from the passage (e.g., to whom or what a 
particular pronoun from the end of the passage referred), each with a 10 sec limit. Finally, the Anomalies test 
(also modified from Haarmann et al.) rapidly presented 104 sentences, each consisting of 13 words presented 
for 450 msec each. Following each sentence (at a ―RESPOND NOW‖ screen), subjects had only 1,500 msec to 
report via keypress whether it made sense or not. Half the sentences were statements and half were questions; 
half of each made sense (e.g., What restaurant did the barber that cut the beard recommend to the couple?) and 
half were nonsensical (e.g., Did the housewife that ate the show find the box in the apartment?). Each trial 
began with a ―READY‖ screen that prompted the subject to press a key to view the next sentence. 
 
Gf tests. Experiment 3 used a nonverbal and a verbal reasoning test (the verbal test also tapped reading 
comprehension). A computerized version of RAPM presented 36 items, divided into 3 sets of 12 (with items 
increasing in difficulty within each set); subjects had 5 min to complete the test. The ETS Following Directions 
test was divided into 2 parts, with each part presenting 10 questions about a particular 5 x 5 matrix of the digits 
1–5 (labeled as Rows A–E and Columns A–E). Each question asked the subject to perform some mental 
permutations and/or scanning of the digits according to some rule (e.g., If one number occurs more frequently 
than another, the answer is the most frequently occurring number; if no number occurs most frequently, the 
answer is the number appearing in the upper left to lower right diagonal), and required a keypress response for 
the correct number. Each problem appeared for 30 sec, with the 5 x 5 matrix of digits in view. 
 
Procedure 
 
Subjects individually completed two 2-h sessions. The first presented the memory tasks in the following order: 
Semantic Conceptual, OSPAN, Abstract Word, Phonological Conceptual, RSPAN, Abstract Nonword, and 
Orthographic Conceptual. The second presented the verbal and Gf tests in the following order: ETS Following 
Directions, Pronoun Texts, RAPM, Anomalies, AFOQT Reading Comprehension, and AFOQT Analogies. 
 
Results 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Mean Performance 
 
Table 7 presents descriptive statistics. All measures were normally distributed as indicated by skew and kur-
tosis, and the memory tasks demonstrated adequate reliability. Most of the verbal and Gf tasks yielded lower 
reliabilities than in our previous experiments, but most reliabilities were adequate, and all tests showed reason-
able patterns of intercorrelations. 
 
The conceptual tasks again differed significantly in mean performance [F(2,172) = 373.44, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .81], with the 
Phonological task yielding lower recall than the Orthographic task [t(86) = 21.28], and the Orthographic task 
again yielding lower recall than the Semantic task [t(86) = 5.03]. Subjects recalled fewer items in the Abstract 
Nonword task than the Abstract Word task [t(86) = 39.71 ], and fewer items in the Reading span task than the 
Operation Span task [t(86) = 8.78]. 
 
Confirmatory Factor Analyses of Memory Span Tasks 
 
Table 8 presents the correlations among the memory and reasoning tasks. We began with a simple model in 
which the three Conceptual tasks, the two STM tasks, and the two WM tasks comprised separate factors; this 
model provided an adequate fit [χ
2
(11) = 16.85,p > .05, χ
2
/df = 1.53, RMSEA = .08, CFI = .97, NFI = .92]. 
However, as in Experiment 2, allowing the Phonological task to split its loadings between Conceptual and STM 
factors yielded a significantly better fitting model [χ
2
difference (1) = 4.56] presented in Figure 3A [χ
2
(10) = 12.30,p 
>.05, χ
2
/df = 1.23, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, NFI = .95]. Replicating Experiment 2, the Phonological task was 
almost equally associated with the two factors, and the two factors shared almost 40% of their variance. Note 
also that the Conceptual factor shared about 50% of its variance with the WM factor, while WM and STM 
shared only about 14% of their variance. Thus, the construct captured by Conceptual span tasks demonstrated 
considerably strong relations to those tapped by STM and WM span tasks. However, a model with all span tasks 
loading onto a single factor did not fit the data [χ
 2
(14) = 67.3 1, p < .05, χ
 2
/df = 4.8 1, RMSEA = .2 1, CFI = 
.74, NFI = .70]. 
 
If Haarmann et al. (2003) were right that the Semantic Conceptual task has some properties that are similar to 
WM span, such as an ability to broadly predict complex cognition (see also Haarmann, Ashling, Davelaar, & 
Usher, 2005), then one might expect the Semantic task to correlate particularly strongly with WM span tasks. In 
fact, inspection of the zero-order correlations reveals that the Semantic task correlated at least as strongly with 
the two WM tasks (rs = .44 and .53 with Operation and Reading span, respectively) as it did with the two other 
Conceptual tasks (rs = .27 and .48 with Phonological and Orthographic tasks, respectively). Thus, we fit a final 
model, illustrated in Figure 3B, in which the Semantic task was allowed to load onto the WM factor. This model 
fit the data very well, and significantly better than the model depicted in Figure 3A [χ
2
(9) = 3.92, p > .05, χ
2
/df = 
0.44, RMSEA = .00, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .98; χ
2
difference (1) = 8.38]. As reflected in the zero-order correlations, 
then, the model shows the Semantic task loading more strongly onto the WM factor than onto the Conceptual 
factor. 
 
 
 
Regression Analyses 
 
Here we tested whether the Conceptual tasks predicted incremental variance in verbal ability and Gf after ac-
counting for shared variance with STM, WM, or both. In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2, we defined verbal 
ability and Gf variables as factor scores, rather than as z-score composites. We did so because Experiment 3 
used only one commonly accepted Gf marker (RAPM), and although the Following Directions test has face 
validity as a Gf task, it also involves reading comprehension and, thus, verbal ability. We therefore conducted a 
principal components analysis, with oblimin rotation, that forced two factors on the reasoning tasks. This 
yielded a clear verbal reasoning factor, with .62 or greater loadings for AFOQT Comprehension and Analogies, 
Pronoun Texts, and Anomalies, a .26 loading for Following Directions and a −.16 loading for RAPM. A clear 
Gf factor also emerged with loadings of .94 for RAPM, .58 for Following Directions, and .37 for Analogies (the 
latter had also showed a reasonable Gf loading in Kane et al., 2004); all other loadings were <.15. We therefore 
used the factor scores that were output from these analyses as indicators of each subject’s verbal ability and Gf 
in all regressions. Note that Gf here had more of a verbal ―flavor‖ than it did in Experiments 1 and 2 (with 
significant variance attributable to Following Directions and Analogies), and so it might be especially likely to 
show a strong association with the Semantic Conceptual task. 
 
Table 9 presents the results of the regression analyses. Surprisingly, only the Phonological and Orthographic 
tasks were significantly correlated with the verbal and Gf factors, and so the Semantic task was unlikely to ac-
count for any significant incremental variance in the regressions. Indeed, for verbal ability, only the 
Phonological task accounted for significant variance after STM, WM, or both, were first entered into the 
models; neither the Orthographic nor the Semantic tasks made significant contributions beyond the variance 
they shared with the Phonological task (this was true whether the STM and WM tasks were entered individually 
or as STM and WM composites). With respect to Gf, none of the Conceptual tasks accounted for incremental 
variance beyond that attributable to STM, WM, or both. 
 
As a secondary consideration, both STM and WM accounted for significant variance in verbal ability and Gf. 
Regarding the former, STM and WM correlated with the verbal factor with rs = .40 and .37, respectively. WM 
accounted for a significant 7% of the variance in verbal ability beyond the 16% accounted for by STM. And, in 
a supplemental analysis in which we regressed verbal ability on WM before STM, STM accounted for a 
significant 9% of the variance beyond the 13% accounted for by WM. Thus, as in prior work (e.g., Cantor et al., 
1991; Engle, Nations, & Cantor, 1990; Engle et al., 1999), WM and STM span tasks accounted for both shared 
and unique variance in verbal ability. It was a bit unusual, however, that the STM correlations were slightly 
stronger than the WM correlations (Daneman & Merikle, 1996). 
 
Still more surprising was that STM accounted for considerable unique variance in Gf, given prior findings that 
verbal STM much less potently predicts nonverbal, general cognitive abilities than does verbal WM (e.g., 
Conway et al., 2002; Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2004). Here, STM and WM correlated with Gf with rs = .41 
and .45, respectively; as shown in Table 9, WM accounted for a significant 12% of the variance beyond the 
17% predicted by STM, and in a subsequent analysis, STM accounted for a significant 8% of the variance 
beyond the 20% predicted by WM. We believe the predictive power of STM here resulted from our defining Gf 
via both verbal and nonverbal tasks. In fact, if we considered only the RAPM test as our sole Gf marker, WM 
predicted significant incremental variance in Gf after accounting for STM (β = .30, F = 7.89, ∆R
2
 = .08), but 
STM did not predict significant variance in Gf after accounting for WM (β =.17, F = 2.5 1, ∆R
2
 = .03). Thus, as 
in previous research (e.g., Engle et al., 1999), the shared variance between WM and STM had some power to 
predict variation in Gf, but WM accounted for significant Gf variance beyond that predicted by STM. 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 
Experiment 3 failed to support the claims that Semantic Conceptual span is a better predictor of higher-order 
cognitive abilities than is simple STM span and an equally good predictor of cognitive abilities as is complex 
WM span. Even though we used two versions of the Haarmann et al. (2003) verbal criterion tasks here, and 
even though subjects completed the Semantic Conceptual task before any of the phonological or STM tasks, the 
Semantic task showed very low correlations with our criterion measures and it accounted for no variation in 
verbal ability or Gf after the other Conceptual tasks were accounted for. The Semantic task did show a stronger 
relation to WM span tasks than did the Orthographic and Phonological tasks, suggesting it tapped something 
―special‖ relative to other STM tasks, but this shared variance with WM obviously did not translate into greater 
predictive validity for higher-order cognition. 
 
Experiment 3 also showed that verbal STM tasks can be strong predictors of some verbal tasks. Although a 
metaanalysis (Daneman & Merikle, 1996) suggests that prototypical verbal ability tests are usually more 
strongly associated with WM span than STM span, this is not always the case (perhaps because word 
knowledge may contribute to both STM span and verbal-ability-test performance; e.g., Engle et al., 1990). 
Indeed, Haarmann et al. (2003) found word span to correlate as strongly as reading span with several 
comprehension and verbal problem solving tasks. In contrast, verbal WM seems much more consistently 
superior to verbal STM in its relation to more domain- general fluid abilities (Conway et al., 2002; Engle et al., 
1999; Kane et al., 2004). The apparent equality of STM and WM in predicting Gf here was a function of 
defining Gf via a combination of verbal reasoning (and comprehension) and nonverbal reasoning tasks. When 
considering only the nonverbal RAPM as an indicator of Gf, WM accounted for more variance than did STM, 
and only WM accounted for unique Gf variance. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
In 3 experiments we tested whether a new version of the Haarmann et al. (2003) Clustered Conceptual Span 
task, which ostensibly requires subjects to actively maintain semantic representations, was a better individual-
differences predictor of verbal and nonverbal cognitive abilities than were traditional STM tasks or nonsemantic 
versions of the Clustered ―Conceptual‖ task. We created nonsemantic Conceptual tasks by presenting short 
word lists clustered by their color (Experiment 1), their first letter (Experiments 1–3), or their initial vowel 
sound (Experiments 2 and 3), and requiring subjects to selectively recall only one cluster from each list. Across 
experiments, the Semantic Conceptual task generally failed to predict incremental variance in either verbal 
ability or Gf after the other Conceptual tasks, or traditional STM tasks, were accounted for. Although the 
Semantic task accounted for unique Gf variance in Experiment 2, the negative Gf findings from Experiments 1 
and 3 suggest either that this one positive result was a fluke, or that the Semantic task’s predictive power is not 
robust to particular experimental or subject variables that are now unknown. Neither interpretation, however, 
calls for much optimism about the use of Semantic Conceptual Span in future individual-differences research. 
Although a semantic STM system may exist, given the compelling findings from experimental and 
neuropsychological research (e.g., Haarman & Usher, 2001; Martin & Freedman, 2001), the clustered Semantic 
Conceptual task does not seem to provide evidence for its importance as an individual-differences variable. 
 
One could argue, however, that our regression analyses were biased against the Semantic task because our STM 
composites included word span, which probably taps both phonological and semantic storage and therefore 
limits any potentially unique contribution of the Semantic task to complex abilities. By this view, if only the 
nonword STM tasks were entered first into the regression equations, the Semantic task should predict 
incremental variance in cognitive ability. We therefore re-ran all our regression analyses by entering only the 
nonword STM span task(s) before the three Conceptual tasks, and found virtually the same patterns of results. 
The only change was that the Orthographic task predicted unique variance in both verbal ability and Gf in 
Experiment 1. As in our original analyses, then, the only place where the Semantic task provided unique 
predictive power was for Gf in Experiment 2. 
 
As a second and final attempt to find some encouraging news for the Semantic task, we re-ran our regressions 
using scores from only the Conceptual tasks’ trials that required recall of the final cluster of the list. These 
recency trials should provide the purest measure of STM capacity because they suffer no retroactive 
interference from intervening items, and indeed, prior studies using such cued-recall tasks have found that final-
cluster recall correlates most strongly with cognitive ability (Cohen & Sandberg, 1977; Cantor et al., 1991; 
Haarmann et al., 2003). So, in each experiment, we regressed verbal ability and Gf scores onto nonword span 
scores first (to account for any phonological contributions to ability), followed by the recency portions of the 
three conceptual tasks. Only one of the six analyses found the Semantic task to predict unique variance in 
ability (in Experiment 2, Semantic recency scores accounted for 7% of the variance in verbal ability beyond that 
accounted for the nonword STM and other Conceptual tasks). Moreover, the significant Semantic-task 
contribution to Gf that we had found in Experiment 2 disappeared when considering only recency scores. We 
thus conclude, again, that our findings do not provide much support for the criterion validity of the Semantic 
Conceptual task. 
 
 
 
Our findings may be at odds with those of Haarmann et al. (2003) because we took their advice and used only a 
clustered version of Conceptual Span, which is less sensitive to the ability to actively cluster random lists. In 3 
experiments, Haarmann et al. (2003) found nonclustered Conceptual Span to correlate strongly with 
comprehension and reasoning, and Haarmann et al. (2005) did so, too. (And, when Haarmann et al. (2003) 
reported a strong Conceptual Span-Gf correlation in a pilot study, it seems to have also been a nonclustered 
task.) To date, then, only one published experiment (Haarmann et al., 2003, Experiment 3) has tested whether 
the clustered version of Conceptual Span correlates with measures of complex cognition. Although the 
clustered task did predict substantial variance in two tests of comprehension and anomaly detection, its 
correlations were a bit weaker than those for the nonclustered task, and they were not contrasted to those for 
STM span tasks (nor to those for nonsemantic Conceptual tasks). 
 
We acknowledge that our clustered tasks were not identical to the Haarmann et al. (2003) clustered conceptual 
task because we presented clusters of varying sizes within each list in unpredictable positions. It is therefore 
possible that a clustered Semantic task with 4 words in every cluster would have performed better than our task, 
but we see no reason why it should. Indeed, Saito (2006) has reported that a clustered Semantic task with 
predictable clusters of 4 words, and a similarly clustered Color task (as in our Experiment 1), were both poor 
predictors of sentence comprehension measures relative to nonclustered Conceptual tasks and WM span tasks. 
 
Our generally disappointing findings regarding the Semantic task therefore suggest that Clustered Conceptual 
span provides little predictive power beyond that already tapped by phonological STM span tasks (or WM span 
tasks). It seems likely, then, that some aspects of clustering ability at encoding, retrieval, or both, is largely 
responsible for any incremental predictive utility of nonclustered Conceptual Span beyond conventional STM 
or WM spans. We would thus revise the advice provided by Haarmann et al. (2003), and suggest that any future 
research with Conceptual Span tasks directly contrast the validity of clustered versus nonclustered versions of 
the Semantic task, as well as contrasting the validity of Semantic Conceptual tasks to nonsemantic tasks like the 
ones we developed here. 
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NOTES 
 
1. Swanson (1992) created two immediate memory tasks for use with children that closely resemble 
Conceptual Span, but the data for these tasks were collapsed with several other memory tasks and so we cannot 
determine how well they individually predicted the criteria measures of academic achievement. 
 
2. We thank Henk Haarmann for providing us with the stimuli and programming codes for the Pronoun Text 
and Anomalies tasks. 
